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Abstract - This paper critically evaluates the argument put forth by the philosopher 
Ingrid Robeyns in her work entitled What, if Anything, is Wrong with Extreme Wealth. 
Robeyns holds the Chair Ethics of Institutions at Utrecht University, and her 
academic research focuses on issues pertaining to contemporary political philosophy 
and applied ethics. In her aforementioned publication, Robeyns defends the political 
theory called limitarianism, which holds that there should be an upper limit to the 
amount of income that an individual can hold. Limitarianism, like many other political 
philosophies, presents a view of how resources ought to be distributed in society 
based, in part, on certain ethical principles. Robeyns explicitly outlines two arguments 
in support of limitarianism as a political philosophy: (1) by eliminating excess wealth, 
limitarianism prevents the super-rich from undermining political equality and (2) by 
redistributing this excess wealth, there will be more resources available to address any 
urgent unmet needs or collective action problems in society. This paper carefully 
reviews and ultimately rejects Robeyns’ defense of limitarianism as a theory of 
political philosophy. This paper sets out to highlight both the flaws in the basic 
premises of limitarianism as a theory as well as the shortcomings of the specific 
arguments that Robeyns’ constructs in support of the theory itself.  
 




The extreme wealth inequality that exists within society today represents a 
severe transgression against the principles of distributive justice. As such, Egalitarians 
and other political philosophy groups have long sought to eradicate wealth inequality 
from society. In attempting to do so, many philosophers have proposed theories that 
focus on implementing a minimum threshold of well-being for the least advantaged 
members of society. However, despite these efforts, major economic reports still 
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show global wealth inequality expanding throughout the world.1 In light of this, many 
philosophers have begun considering alternative and unconventional solutions to the 
wealth inequality dilemma. One of these philosophers is Ingrid Robeyns, who wrote 
an article in 2019 proposing limitarianism as a suitable theory of wealth distribution. 
 Limitarianism is a newly developed ethical theory which claims that there 
should be an upper limit to the amount of money that an individual can rightfully 
hold. This is supported by the belief that above a certain level, an individual’s income 
becomes surplus money, which limitarianism defines as money above what one needs 
for a fully flourishing life.2 In her work, Robeyns presents two arguments in defense 
of the claim that it is morally impermissible for individuals to hold surplus money and 
be excessively rich. She refers to these two arguments as the democratic argument and 
the urgent unmet needs argument. In this paper, I will reject the defense of 
limitarianism that Ingrid Robeyns presents in her work entitled What, if Anything, is 
Wrong with Extreme Wealth. I will refute both the underlying premise of limitarianism 
itself as well as the two arguments that Robeyns raises as justifications of the theory. 
In doing so, I will highlight the ways in which Robeyns’ work is riddled with flawed 
logic and infeasible assumptions.  
In the first section of my paper, I will briefly reconstruct both of Robeyns’ two 
main arguments in defense of limitarianism. In the ensuing section, I will begin my 
rebuttal of Robeyns’ work by undermining the core premise of limitarianism, which 
states that at a certain level an individual’s income becomes surplus money. After 
accomplishing this, I will go on in my next two sections to show that even if we were 
to accept the claim that above a certain level income becomes surplus money, 
Robeyns’ two arguments in defense of limitarianism still fail to justify the 
government's right to restrict citizens from holding surplus money. I will address the 
democratic argument in section three before turning to the urgent unmet needs 
argument in section four. Finally, in the last section I will conclude my paper and 
summarize my position in opposition to both Robeyns and limitarianism.  
Robeyns’ Two Arguments in support of Limitarianism  
          When presenting the democratic argument for limitarianism, Robeyns suggests 
that the superrich have the ability to translate their surplus money into political 
power. Robeyns reasons that spending surplus money does not result in an objective 
 
1
 Gabriel Zucman, “Global Wealth Inequality,” Annual Review of Economics 11, no. 1 (2019): 109, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025852.  
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loss of welfare or reduction in quality of life for the rich.3 As such, this gives the rich 
the ability to freely spend their surplus money. In addition, the rich are incentivized 
to use their surplus money to purchase political power. By acquiring political power, 
the rich are then able to influence the passing of legislation that furthers their 
personal interests.4 According to Robeyns, the rich can acquire this power in a variety 
of ways. Among these include indebting politicians and political parties by funding 
their campaign efforts as well as controlling the public perception of politics by 
purchasing the rights to media outlets and lobbyists that disseminate information. 
Robeyns contends that acquiring political power gives the rich an unfair advantage 
over the poor and undermines the political equality of citizens, which she claims to be 
the “cornerstone of free and democratic societies.''5 Robeyns does consider one 
objection to her position, stating that critics might argue that it is the political process 
itself that must be fixed in order to solve this political inequality problem. In other 
words, rather than implementing an upper wealth limit, critics would say that it is the 
laws and institutions that enable the acquisition of political power that must be 
amended in order to create political equality within society. Robeyns however 
responds by saying that even if society enacted anti-corruption policies and modified 
existing political processes, the super-rich would still be able to find alternative ways 
to create asymmetrical political power. Thus, in Robeyns view, restricting individuals 
from possessing surplus money is the only solution to this political inequality 
problem.  
          The argument for urgent unmet needs rests upon three conditions that 
Robeyns presents in her paper. Robeyns claims that if at least one of these conditions 
hold, the argument for urgent unmet needs serves as a justification for limitarianism.6 
The three conditions are extreme global poverty, local or global disadvantages 
stemming from a lack of financial resources, and urgent collective action problems. 
Robeyns asserts that each of these conditions, if present, possesses a “higher moral 
urgency than the desires that can be fulfilled through rich people’s income and 
wealth.”7 She reasons that since surplus money cannot be used to increase an 
individual's overall prosperity, it therefore holds no moral weight. As such, it follows 
that this surplus money ought to be redistributed to address any urgent unmet needs, 
which all hold significant moral weight. In the paper, Robeyns highlights climate 
change as an urgent collective action problem currently facing society which justifies 
the reallocation of the rich’s surplus money.  
 
3
 Robeyns, 255.  
4 Robeyns, 255.  
5
 Robeyns, 256. 
6
 Robeyns, 257. 
7
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Preference Satisfaction: The Case against Objective 
Measures of Wellbeing  
          I have just provided a detailed summary of Robeyns’ two arguments in 
defense of limitarianism. Before specifically addressing and refuting these two 
arguments, I wish to first challenge the core underlying premise of limitarianism as a 
theory. Limitarianism rests upon the premise that above a certain wealth level, 
additional income is unable to contribute to an individual’s prosperity or overall 
wellbeing. The income that exceeds this specified upper wealth limit is referred to as 
surplus money. This conception of surplus money necessarily assumes that individual 
wellbeing is objectively measured. This assumption should not be blindly accepted 
seeing as it is inconsistent with many long-established subjectivist theories of 
wellbeing.  
One subjective theory of welfare is preference satisfaction, which maintains 
that individuals derive welfare from pleasure-producing activities (Dolan 5). 
According to this theory, pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value to human 
beings. As such, we achieve welfare or utility by attaining pleasure. However, the 
ways in which individuals attain pleasure are subjective in the sense that they vary 
from person to person. Preference satisfaction holds that individuals have unique 
pleasure-inducing preferences, and it is through the satisfaction of these subjective 
preferences that we generate welfare.8 
          The disparity that exists between people’s hobbies and interests aligns with 
subjectivist theories of wellbeing such as preference satisfaction. It is therefore rather 
difficult to argue that individuals’ wellbeing can be measured objectively. If we accept 
the indisputable fact that individuals have different interests and preferences, it 
reasonably follows that we must also accept that the amount of money that 
individuals spend on achieving wellbeing is dependent on these personalized interests 
and preferences. If this is true, how can we set a uniform upper income limit which 
applies to everyone? Take an example of two individuals with different passions. 
Individual A loves surfing more than any other activity in the world. Individual A is 
lucky that surfing happens to be a relatively inexpensive hobby. Conversely, 
Individual B is passionate about traveling. In fact, Individual B derives a comparative 
amount of utility from traveling as Individual A does from surfboarding. However, 
given the expensive nature of traveling, Individual B spends a far greater amount of 
money on travelling each year than Individual A does on surfing. This simplistic 
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example highlights a key problem with the notion of a uniform income limit. Two 
individuals will very likely have to spend different amounts of money in order to 
reach the same level of wellbeing on account of each individual’s unique preferences 
and the costs associated with satisfying these preferences. Thus, limitarianism fails to 
recognize that welfare cannot be objectively equated across individuals. As such, I 
contest that the subjectivity of welfare requires a unique and personalized upper 
income limit be set for each individual in order to satisfy the limitarian concept of 
surplus money.  
          Despite the infeasibility of the notion, suppose the government did in fact set a 
personalized upper income limit for each member of society based on his or her 
unique preferences. Are we nevertheless convinced that above this upper limit, an 
individual is unable to use any additional income to generate prosperity or wellbeing? 
Both prosperity and wellbeing are associated with an individual’s level of happiness, 
which is generally accepted to be an unquantifiable state of emotion. How then can 
we definitively say that a maximum value exists on an individual’s welfare? In order to 
deny this statement, we would be forced to accept welfare as having an infinite range 
of values, which I argue is entirely plausible.  
There are seemingly two ways in which welfare could be infinite. First, 
individuals could continue to gain additional welfare by spending money on activities 
and goods that satisfy their pleasures. If an individual, for instance, derived pleasure 
from being the most powerful person alive, then perhaps he or she would continue to 
boost their welfare infinitely until they acquired all the wealth in the world (which is 
effectively impossible). I must admit however that this example is a bit preposterous 
in nature, and it does seem likely that individuals at a certain point would no longer be 
able to acquire additional goods that generated welfare.  
 Welfare can also possess infinite value if people generate utility through 
altruistic acts. In this instance, by helping others achieve prosperity, an individual also 
increases his or her own wellbeing. Individuals may get satisfaction from choosing 
their own charities to contribute to rather than having the government redistribute 
their money for them. For example, if somebody was passionate about cancer 
research, they could seemingly donate an infinite amount of money to this cause and 
thereby generate an infinite amount of welfare. Individuals could also continue to gain 
welfare by accumulating money and saving it with the intention of passing the wealth 
down to their offspring. If an individual gains welfare from knowing that their future 
kin are financially secure, each additional dollar of income generates additional welfare 
by guaranteeing that another future generation is financially well-off. These two 
examples of infinite altruistic welfare generating acts invalidate the limitarian claim 
that surplus money cannot be used to generate additional wellbeing.  
 I have just disproved the concept of surplus money and the assumption that 
individual’s wellbeing is objectively measured. Nevertheless, let us momentarily forget 
about my previous work and instead pretend that limitarianism is right in asserting 
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that wellbeing can be objectively and uniformly measured and that above a certain 
level an individual can no longer generate welfare from additional income. In this 
scenario, how would we go about setting this income limit? I contest that there would 
never be a general consensus as to how to go about objectively measuring wellbeing 
even if we believed that it could be objectively measured. Wellbeing has an 
interpretative meaning, and as such it is highly likely that individuals possess many 
different conceptions of wellbeing. It seems exceedingly unlikely that there would 
ever be complete agreement upon the way in which to measure wellbeing. If, then, 
there will always be those who disagree with the setting of the income limit, is it not 
the case that there will always be an element of arbitrariness associated with the exact 
designation of this limit? If there is always subjectivity involved in setting the income 
threshold, there can be no certainty that we are not unjustly taking from individuals’ 
money that could be used towards increasing their own personal wellbeing. Thus, 
even when accepting this underlying premise of limitarianism, we find that the 
infeasibility of setting an upper income limit renders the entire process arbitrary, 
thereby invalidating the objectivity of the limitarian concept of surplus money.  
Refuting the Democratic Argument for Limitarianism  
 
In the preceding section, I explained why the core underlying premise of 
limitarianism does not hold. However, in the following two sections, for the sake of 
evaluating Robeyns’ two arguments, we shall pretend that this premise of 
limitarianism is both ideologically sound and feasible. I will operate under the 
pretense that there is in fact an upper income limit that can be set, above which an 
individual's income is classified as surplus money which cannot be used to increase 
his or her personal wellbeing. It is under this veil that I will evaluate the two main 
arguments that Robeyns uses in her paper to justify the government’s right to create a 
100% tax rate on individual’s surplus money.  
The democratic argument for limitarianism is concerned with the potential for 
individuals to translate their surplus money into political power. This, according to 
Robeyns, poses a fundamental threat to democracy by undermining the political 
equality of citizens. While I accept that the ability to purchase political power 
represents a grave danger to a well-functioning democracy, I reject the idea that 
confiscating an individual's surplus money solves this problem. Robeyns writes, 
“because rich people have surplus money, they are both very able and seemingly very 
likely to use that money to acquire political influence and power.… one can better use 
that money for political influence so that legislation, when implemented, serves one’s 
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interests.”9 Robeyns stipulates that because this surplus money has no real impact on 
wellbeing, it will be used to buy political influence. However, if purchasing political 
power ‘serves one’s interests’ as Robeyns writes in her work, then this act would 
seemingly increase an individual’s overall welfare. As such, I see no reason why an 
individual would be strictly limited to only using their allotment of surplus money to 
acquire political power. Manipulating the rules of society to serve one’s own interest 
can create enormous benefits to an individual’s life. On account of the significant 
rewards that come from acquiring political power, I attest that an individual would be 
incentivized to purchase political power even if they did not possess surplus money. 
In fact, it could be argued that as long as an individual has wealth in excess of that 
which is needed to attain basic necessities such as food, water and shelter, there will 
always be a temptation to use money to purchase political power.  
In her work, Robeyns denies the objection that it is the political process, 
institutions and statutes that must be modified in order to prevent individuals from 
acquiring political power and undermining political equality. I however do not believe 
that Robeyns is able to successfully overcome this objection. If the political system is 
still designed in a way that gives citizens the ability to purchase political influence, I 
do not see how implementing an upper income limit will prevent them from doing so. 
Considering that currency in and of itself has no intrinsic value, everything pertaining 
to money is relative. While instituting an upper income limit reduces the wealth gap 
between the richest and poorest members of society, it also reduces the purchasing 
power of the rich. Consequently, the amount of money needed to purchase political 
power would also decrease in proportion to this decrease in wealth of the rich. As 
such, if an upper income limit was implemented, the wealthy would still have the 
ability to purchase political power and this imbalance between the rich and poor 
would still exist. As long as the political process still enables individuals to buy 
influence, political inequality will remain within society. Robeyns argues that without 
surplus money individuals would not purchase political power. However, she fails to 
account for the basic economic principle that states that prices in the economy fall in 
the long run as the supply of money decreases. Even if the government confiscated 
an individual's surplus money, the rich would still have more freedom with which to 
spend their money than the poor. This would put the rich in position to continue to 
take advantage of the political system and unfairly buy political power in order to 
serve their personal interests. Thus, if the justification for the democratic argument is 
that an upper income limit produces strict political equality, then this does hold as a 
defense of limitarianism.  
Refuting the Urgent Unmet Needs Argument  
 
9
 Robeyns, 255. 
 
 




In the last section, I showed how instituting an upper income limit fails to 
accomplish Robeyns’ goal of creating political equality within society. Instead, I 
demonstrated that the solution to this political inequality problem which Robeyns 
presents is not limitarianism but rather reforming the political institutions and statues 
that enable the purchasing of political power. Similarly, in this section, I show how 
Robeyns is misguided in believing that limitarianism acts as a solution to addressing 
these urgent unmet needs that exist within the world. If the argument is that these 
urgent unmet needs require immediate financial resources, I contest that instituting an 
upper income limit actually restricts the amount of money that can be redistributed 
towards these causes and therefore does not represent the optimal way to address 
these needs.  
Robeyns does an excellent job of making the case that all of the three types of 
urgent unmet needs currently exist within our world. Additionally, it seems 
undeniable that each of these conditions requires immediate attention and funding on 
account of their extreme levels of severity. As such, it seems that the fundamental 
purpose of Robeyns’ argument is that we need to redistribute as much money as is 
morally permissible towards these urgent unmet needs. If we can collectively agree 
that this is Robeyns’ objective, then we must recognize that limitarianism fails to best 
accomplish this goal. Economists have shown that the tax rate which generates the 
highest amount of revenue is somewhere around 70%. At the rate of 100% which 
limitarianism supports, individuals will retain none of their income above the wealth 
limit and will therefore have no incentive to ever exceed the income limit. Thus, in 
order to create the greatest amount of tax revenue and subsequent funding for these 
urgent unmet needs, Robeyns ought to abandon limitarianism in favor of a 
progressive taxation rate.  
Robeyns addresses this objection in her paper and refers to it as the ‘negative 
incentive objection’. Robeyns acknowledges that limitarianism may not generate the 
optimal amount of tax revenue and admits that a progressive tax rate could be a better 
solution for the urgent unmet needs dilemma. Despite the strength of this objection, 
Robeyns responds by saying two things. First, she says that if we are more concerned 
about addressing the political inequality in society than the urgent unmet needs, 
limitarianism is still a valid economic design. In the previous section, I explained why 
implementing an upper income limit would fail to solve the political inequality 
problem. Second, even if a progressive tax rate is optimal for addressing the urgent 
unmet needs, Robeyns writes that ‘limitarianism as a moral ideal would be 
unaffected.’10 In the second section of my paper, I rejected the limitarian conception 
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of surplus money, thereby undermining the moral permissibility of taking 100% of an 
individual’s income if we cannot be sure that this income cannot be used to increase 
his or her own wellbeing. Considering that I have already disproven both of Robeyns’ 
responses to the negative incentive objection, we must conclude that this objection 
renders the urgent unmet needs argument invalid as a defense of limitarianism.  
Conclusion  
I have rejected Robeyns’ defense of limitarianism in her work What, if Anything, 
is Wrong with Extreme Wealth. After reconstructing Robeyns’ position, I first examined 
limitarianism as a whole and explained why the underlying premise of the theory does 
not hold. I argue that wellbeing cannot be objectively measured, and as such the 
limitarian concept of surplus money is invalid. I then refuted both of the arguments 
that Robeyns raises in her paper as justifications for limitarianism. I showed that 
instituting an upper wealth limit does not eradicate political inequality from society 
and that only by modifying the political process itself may we eliminate the ability for 
the rich to purchase political power. Additionally, I showed that the urgent unmet 
needs argument fails to overcome the negative objection incentive. I argue that if 
Robeyns wishes to reallocate the maximum amount of morally permissible wealth 
towards these conditions, a progressive taxation system is more optimal than an 
upper wealth limit. Thus, by systematically evaluating and refuting each element of 
Robeyns’ argument, I have in this paper shown limitarianism to be an indefensible 
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